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maintaining institutional facts is power” (103). Deontic powers
either prompt people to do something or exclude people from
doing something “without using force” (147). For example, to
declare that “Obama is President” or “Locke is the property
owner” is to acknowledge their rights and obligations in those
roles, to prompt them to fulfill those roles, and to exclude
others from exercising the powers that accompany those roles.
Feminists have long been interested in institutional terms like
“husband” and “wife,” perhaps in part because of the deontic
powers that tend to accompany each. Feminists have also
been interested in the phenomenon of collective recognition
in the sense that acceptance and internalization of some social
norms has hindered personal development. For example, if
one accepted the traditional conception of “wife” with all of its
deontic “powers,” one would be disinclined to go to college,
pursue a career in film-making or drag racing, etc. Although
Searle describes the social world and institutional facts from
a broadly analytic perspective, and although many feminists
are rooted in the continental tradition, his account reinforces
feminist concerns with vocabulary as an instrument of power.
His account is also remarkably empowering. It reaffirms the
notion that current power structures can be dismantled if
enough people choose to stop believing in, or choose to create
new, institutions.
Searle’s layered argument, moving from mind and
intentionality to language and society, is at once technical and
full of common sense. Those who are not terribly familiar with
Searle are likely to get the most from this text. Those who have
been following Searle’s ongoing discussion of social ontology
may not be surprised by much of what he offers here. One might
allege that Searle’s account is too tidy and comprehensive,
relying on the single linguistic construct of the Status Function
Declaration to ground out and explain the entirety of human
civilization. Nonetheless, Searle presents a solid point of
departure for further questions about social ontology and
rightly reminds us that institutional facts are dynamic human
creations.
Endnotes
1. J.L. Austin. How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962).
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“More Feminist Spinozists Thinking More”
The purpose of this volume, according to the editor Moira
Gatens, is to show that “Feminist scholarship can offer new
interpretative insights into the notoriously difficult philosophy
of Benedict Spinoza”(1). This book successfully achieves this
aim, and more. The articles in this volume show us that viewing
Spinoza’s work with a feminist lens reveals neglected aspects
of Spinoza’s philosophy; further, focusing on these neglected
aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy exposes unexamined dualisms
in feminist philosophers’ own practices and presuppositions.
That is not to say that there is a unitary feminist lens. One of
the strengths of this collection is the variety of backgrounds
and methods of the contributors and the debates to which their

commentaries belong. Liberal feminists, feminists from the
psychoanalytic tradition, Marxist feminists, and those whose
work bridges schools and traditions, all find in Spinoza’s work
productive ideas with something to offer to the classic problems
of feminist theory: the nature of social categories, sexuality, the
fate of the passions and the imagination in philosophy.
Gatens’ introduction provides a good overview of Spinoza’s
philosophy, highlighting those aspects that may be of particular
interest to feminist theorists, which are taken up by contributors
to the volume: the positive role of the imagination in Spinoza’s
philosophy (Gatens, Lloyd, Grassi); Spinoza’s rejection of
dualism (Gatens, Lloyd, Ravven, Strong, West, Donovan);
Spinoza’s naturalistic but non-reductionist theory of the affects
(Gatens, Ravven, Rorty, Matheron); Spinoza’s conception of
relational freedom and the social self (Strong, Rorty, Lloyd,
Ravven). Focusing particularly on aspects of Spinoza’s work that
are neglected by mainstream scholarship, the articles collected
here offer new and exciting interpretations of each. Amelie
Rorty’s classic piece on Spinoza’s passions examines Spinoza’s
understanding of how the passions can be reformed without
thereby excising them, thus differentiating Spinoza from those
who thought freedom involved being free of emotions. Rorty
deftly performs spinozism by teaching us about love as first a
passive and then an active affect through her example of the
development of Ariadne’s love for Echo. Ariadne learns of the
forces which caused her love for Echo, and learns what Echo
is beyond her passionate love; thus, she is able to finally and
actively love Echo not just as the object of her affection, but as
a genuine individual, a singular part of nature.
Although Gatens admits that some Spinoza scholars may be
surprised at what feminists can contribute to Spinoza scholarship,
the bigger surprise may be that Spinoza has anything to offer
contemporary feminists. How could Spinoza—an unapologetic
metaphysician, a determinist, a rationalist, and a student of
Hobbes’ political philosophy—have anything to say to the issues
that matter to contemporary feminist philosophy? Alexandre
Matheron, with his usual humor and facility with Spinoza’s texts,
shows how Spinoza’s sole norm, “to understand,” can still lead
us to radically rethink our present social conditions. Aurelia
Strong proposes that Spinoza’s conception of the individual
offers a way of capturing the insights both of liberalism and
communitarianism without the drawbacks of either. Strong
argues that Spinoza’s work thus offers a better framework for
understanding the reciprocal relations between individuals and
the social world, which provides the philosophical foundations
for a notion of relational autonomy. Heidi Ravven and Genevieve
Lloyd explore the ways in which Spinoza’s sometimes difficult
philosophy sheds light on the extent to which feminist theorists’
own concepts and preconceptions work against them and
contain traces of dualisms and religious traditions which
feminists constantly critique.
One of the few new pieces for the collection, Ravven’s
historical article argues that those feminists who reject
determinism rely on a “magical” conception of the human
person derived from Christianity. Ravven proposes that Spinoza’s
understanding of individuals’ beliefs and desires as caused
derives from a Judeo-Arabic tradition whereby individuals are
understood as part of Nature, not outside of it. Ravven argues
that Spinoza’s alternative conception of human nature enables
us to see the way in which our conception of social reform is
tied to a false picture of human freedom. Social reform does
not require a “magical conception of the human persons” but
rather requires understanding the actual forces, social, affective,
and otherwise, that impinge upon each individual, causing
their desires and shaping their self-conceptions. Reiterating the
spinozist dictum to understand, Ravven proposes that Spinoza’s
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method provides a route toward a mature non-moralistic ethics,
one that would focus on what we are before telling us what we
ought to do and be. Genevieve Lloyd, in a piece from her book
Part of Nature, similarly shows that by focusing on Spinoza’s
genuine alternative to Cartesian dualism, we can see that
feminists’ critiques of dualism have been undermined by their
adherence to the sex/gender distinction, which repeats the
dualism of the sexed body and the gendered mind, the latter
a “social construction” which, because not biological we are
magically free to change.

Reservations
This is an essential book for any research library, and the
best collection yet showing both what feminists have to say
about Spinoza and what Spinoza has to offer contemporary
feminism. While there is much to commend this volume, as
someone familiar with the series and with the research area, I
found it somewhat disappointing. First of all, and immediately
recognizable to anyone who has ever handled the books in
this series: it’s a bit light. Weighing in at a mere 239 pages,
Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza has 119 pages
less than the average for the series (358 pages) with some of
the larger volumes near 500 pages. Is there half as much to say
about feminism and Spinoza as there is about feminism and
Ayn Rand? (432 pages) Is there less to say about Spinoza than
Rousseau, one who took so much from Spinoza while publically
offering him only insult? (480 pages) Is there less to say about
Spinoza than Descartes, whose dualism Spinoza rejected so
completely? (348 pages) While portability is an asset, I found
myself wanting more.
Further, more than half of the articles in the book have been
publically available for nearly 20 years. The paperback edition
contains eleven articles, seven of which have been published
elsewhere, most in the early-mid nineties. The impression this
slight book gives is that there were once some philosophers
writing about the intersections of feminism and Spinoza, but
that this project is now over. As such the volume’s diversity
seems to suggest that the work on Spinoza and feminism
is haphazard and disconnected, rather than as indicators of
the vibrant and growing research program I believe it to be.
Although I am indebted to Gatens’ work philosophically, I am
disappointed with this edited volume. Its brevity is evidence of
a missed opportunity to showcase the brilliant work done by
feminist spinozists in the last 15 years.
These articles, in their original forms, inspired a research
program in spinozistic feminism, which offered a new way
to approach the reality and power of bodies, a new way to
understand how the path to reason can be approached only
through understanding the affects, and a new way to understand
the self as social. This new work on Spinoza and feminism,
which was inspired by Gatens, Lloyd, Ravven, and Rorty, needs
its own volume indicating the current and flourishing state of
international work on Spinoza. Hasana Sharp ends her review
of this book with the hope that it will be the prolegomenon
for work yet to come. I’d like to second her suggestion with
the caveat that perhaps the material conditions for such a
volume need to come first: a conference, a society, or both
for the burgeoning field of Spinoza studies taking seriously the
problems of feminism, or rather the field of feminist philosophy
taking up Spinoza’s ideas.
Spinoza did not think that the sage, alone and separate from
the rest of humanity, was the ideal or most powerful state for
humans. Even the freest individual was weak when considered
alone, disconnected from others; one’s power was miniscule
when compared to the whole of nature. Only through joining
with others can the free individual increase his or her power.
This is helpful advice for the as yet to be called into being society

of feminist spinozists, existing as we do in the often inhospitable
universe of academic philosophy. So, I don’t blame or excoriate
Gatens for having disappointed specialists. The geographic
distance and the linguistic and academic differences that
separate feminist philosophers working on Spinoza today is
daunting. Overcoming these obstacles requires the work of
more than just one individual.

Conclusion
Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza offers us a glimpse
of the possibilities of the intersections of Spinoza’s philosophy
and feminist theory, but only a glimpse. Readers looking for an
introduction to the feminist interpretation of Spinoza should
look to Lloyd and Gatens’ previous work, Collective Imaginings,
for a systematic elaboration of their ideas, including their view
of the usefulness of Spinoza’s conception of responsibility. For
those feminist theorists who have already recognized the value
of Spinoza’s philosophy, this review is a call to action. Feminist
spinozism is an extremely promising area of philosophical
research. However, the brevity of this collection and the age
of many of its articles tell us that those feminists working on
Spinoza’s philosophy today are not working together, and are
not communicating their work to one another well enough.
We need something that might link those feminist luminaries
with young scholars, which might bring together the strands
of Spinoza scholars with feminist inclinations from their varied
locations around the globe. If there were such a group, such
communication, this book would have been different, heftier
at least. In conclusion: this is a good start, but we need more
feminist spinozists thinking more!
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Think of the chapters of Penny A. Weiss’s slim book, Canon
Fodder: Historical Women Political Thinkers, as a philosophical
dim sum or tapas: small, varied, and intensely flavored morsels
that can be consumed in any order, savored, and contemplated.
Most of the chapters are independently satisfying, and each
leaves one wondering where a more extensive treatment might
lead. The book itself extends an invitation—even a demand—for
philosophers to continue enriching the field by engaging with
the contributions of historical women writers.
Weiss’s essays address several authors stretching over one
thousand years: Sei Shōnagon, Christine de Pizan, Mary Astell,
Mary Wollstonecraft, Anna Julia Cooper, Emma Goldman,
and the authors of the Declaration of Sentiments. The framing
principle is a desire to reshape radically the landscape of
political theory, and this eclectic list possesses a kind of internal
logic; each writer explores central but neglected concepts
that could contribute significantly to transforming political
philosophy. The concepts include a creative methodology for
comprehending the world, musings on the politics of inclusion,
marriage, and the state of nature, community and friendship,
equality of gender within the polity, community and harmony,
and children. Considering this list (lists are important in this
book) the cluster of ideas could be loosely formed into a partial
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